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ALLEGED IRREGULARITY IN ADOPTION OF CONSTITUTION 279
*THE LEGAL EFFECT UNDER AMERICAN DECIS-
IONS OF AN ALLEGED IRREGULARITY IN THE
ADOPTION OF A CONSTITUTION OR CON-
STITUTIONAL AMENDMENT.
Essentially there are but three fundamental considerations
that underly all the American decisions on the above entitled
subject: first, are the particular issues really judicial or are
tly political in their nature? Second, if they are judicial,
then who was it that acted in the adoption of the particular
constitution or constitutional amendment-the legislature,
the convention, or the people? Third, once having decided
who the party in action is, the next question that arises is,
under what power does that party aet-a constitutional pro-
vision, a legislative act, or a popular enactment?
There are a great number of cases which are decided
purely on the basis of the first consideration, namely, that
the courts, upon a purview of the particular facts involved,
declare that the issues are essentially political in their nature,
and that the courts are therefore concluded by the political
decision already made by the other departments of govern-
ment.
Then, there are those cases in which the courts, having
recognized the issues as judicial in nature, proceed to the
consideration of the question: who has acted? If it is a legis-
lative act that is in question, then there is a marked tendency
to enforce on the legislative body the letter of the constitution
whereunder that legislature functions. If it is a convention
that has acted then the tendency is to consider that body as
the direct representative of the people, possessing full soy-
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ereignty, and their act is upheld if it is in any way possible.
If it is the people that have acted, or acquiesced in an act,
then the courts are especially liberal in their views on the
matter.
Now as to the third consideration, that is, under what
power has the party acted, the decisions disclose a greater
regard for constitutional provision and popular enactmentb
than are shown for mere legislative acts. This third con-
sideration, however, is dealt with by the courts in connection
with the other two,; and, therefore, the settlement of either
one of the other two issues, necessarily involves a decision
also of this last.
Just what the fate of an irregularly adopted amendment
or constitution would be, depends, to a great extent, on the
court's answer to the above-mentioned fundamental considera-
tion, and to a lesser degree, upon other considerations that
will later appear in this paper. Upon the basis of these two
natural divisions of the cases, this thesis proceeds to a de-
tailed consideration of the law and decision on alleged ir-
regularities in the adoption of constitutions or constitutional
amendments, state or federal-
To begin with, historically, it was much doubted whether
the courts had any jurisdiction whatsoever in the question
under consideration. It was contended that amendments and
constitutions were totally in the domain of the political de-
partment, and that the court could do nothing but follow
those decisions. Hence, in Luther versus Borden,' arising as
late as 1849, Chief Justice Taney wrote, "In forming the
constitutions of the different states after the Declaration of
1. 7 How. 1.
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ILdependnce and in the various and different changes which
have since been made, the political department has always
determined whether the proposed constitution or amendment
was ratified or not by the people, and the judicial power has
followed its decision." Despite this statement by the federal
court, the states, however, had already begun to entertain
judicial jurisdiction for the question. Thus, in 1836, in State
v. McBride,2 Nissouri recognized and asserted judicial power
to inquire into the validity of a proposed amendment. So
also in 1856, IMississippi followed the case of Green v. Weller;3
and in 1876, Mlinneso-ta, in the case of Dayton v. St. Paul.4
But these cases upheld the questioned amendment. It was in
1880 in the case of Collier v. Frierson,5 that a state constitu-
tional amendment v as, for the first time, declared invalid be-
cause of an ir-.egularity in adoption. Before 1880 there were
hardly more than half a dozen cases on the question, but since
that date they have been numerous. State courts have fre-
quently exercised supervision over all the steps of amending.
And from the state decisions, federal courts too have gradu-
ally begun to recognize the issues as not purely political but
judicial in their nature.
Yet there are distinct instances in which the courts are
forever concluded by the political nature of the case. For
example, the courts cannot investigate alleged irregularities
in the adoption of an original constitution by a newly admitted
state. For no matter what irregularities are alleged, as long
as the constitution and the state have already been recognized
2. 4 Mo. 303.
3. 32 Miss. 650.
4. 22 Minn. 400.
5. 24 Ala. 100.
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by Congress, then this admission to the Union has cured all
possible defects. Brittle v. People.0 Moreover, where Con-
gress submits certain changes to a proposed original con-
stitution, as conditions precedent to admission, then, although
those changes are adopted by the legislature without sub)-
mission ta the people, yet such an irregularity is cured by
admission, and the courts are, even here, concluded by the
political decision. Brittle v. Peoplef McCormick v. Weste;n
Union Telegraph Co.;8 Secombe v. Kittelson0  Whether an
original constitution actually furnishes the Republican form
of government, guaranteed to the state or the federal Con-
stitution, is also a political question decided by the Congress
and the President and not subject to judicial investigation.
Again, where a constitution has been established by the
peaceful means that is technically known as "revolution," in
law, then too it is a political issue and the courts will recog-
nize it as long as the other departments of government have.
To quote Judge Taylor in Kamper v. Hawkins, ° "The con-
vention of Virginia (1776) had not the shadow of a legal or
constitutional form about it. It derived its existence and
authority from a higher source; a power which could super-'
sede all law, and annul the constitution itself-namely, the
people, in their sovereign, unlimited, and unlimitable author-
ity and capacity."
Furthermore, where the particular trial court exists by
6. 2 Nebr. 198.
7. 2 Nebr. 198.
8. 79 Fed. 449.
9. 29 'Minn. 555.
10. 1 Va. Cas. 20.
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virtue of a newly adopted constitution, the adoption of which
comes Lefore that couit, it cannot possibly decide such a con-
stitution invalid for it would thereby be putting itself out of
existence, and make its decision a nullity.
Trial of Dorr-Rhode Island Supreme Court;1 Loomis v.
Jackson;12 Koehler v. Hill;13 Brittle v. People;14 Luther v.
Borden.15 Where the people and the departments of govern-
ment have long acquiesced in a questioned amendment or con-
stitution, the courts will decide that the question is politically
settled, as in Taylor v. Comm.,' 6 wherein it was held that the
constitution proclaimed by the convention of 1902, without
submission to the people, had become the legal constitution
by acquiescence and recognition by the people and the several
departments of state government. Or, as Judge Nelson aptly
states it in the case of Kamper v. Hawkins,17 "It is confess-
edly the assent of the people which gives validity to a consti-
tution. May not the people, then, by subsequent acquiescence
and assent, give a constitution, under whicll they have acted
for seventeen years, as much validity, at least, as long as they
acquiesce in it, as if it had been previously expressly author-
ized ?"
As to the propriety of an amendment the courts have
carefully avoided the possibilities of becoming entangled in
such matters. Although the courts have ruled on the limita-
tions that are imposed by constitutions on the amending bodies
or revising bodies, nevertheless the courts refuse to extend
12. 6 West Va. 613.
13. 60 Iowa 543.
14. 2 Nebr. 198.
15. 7 How. 1.
16. 101 Va. 829.
17. 1 Va. Cas. 20.
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jurisdiction to the question of the propriety of certain pieces
of legislation. For there is a grave danger involved, that
once such a restriction be established by judicial decree, then
removal thereof would be impossible, except by the adoption
of an entirely new constitution by the revolutionary method.
Thus the courts avoid all implied limitations on the amendine
power for the good of public policy. Whether a law is ap-
propriate or not is a political question entirely. What the
substance is, is a political question, and the court concerns
itself only with the form or method of adoption-and no more.
Feigenspan Case.'
This point is especially brought out in the case of Edward
v. Leseuer, 9 wherein it was held that since the amendment to
the constitution derives its authority from the people, it is,
generally recognized that the judiciary have no right to ques-
tion the wisdom or expediency of changes made in the funda-
mentallaw;-with the question "that the courts do have juris-
diction to determine the reasonableness of enactments passed
in the exercise of the police power."
So much for those cases wherein the courts have decided
that the issues were political in nature and that hence the
courts must but follow the decisions of the other govern-
mental departments.
Put once a question is recognized as one for the judiciary,
then immediately there arise all the other considerations;-
who passed the amendment-a legislature, a convention, or
the people ;-and under what power did they act-under the
constitution, under a legislative enabling act, or under a
18. 253 U. S. 221.
19. 132 Mo. 410.
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popular enactment? These will be considered consecutively:
To begin with the legislative amendment, acts, and powers,
and the limitations that decisions have recognized with ref-
erence to them: As to the federal amendments the Consti-
tution places but two limitations on Congress; the amend-
ments must be passed by two-thirds of those Houses, and "'no
state without its consent shall be deprived of its equal suf-
frage in the Senate." With only these two limitations wiat
irregularities, then, could possibly have arisen under the
Congressional portion of the amendment system?
One of the first questions to arise was What is meant by
the provision "two-thirds of the Houses?" It was contended
that the true meaning was two-thirds of both Houses. But
it was decided in Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Kansas20 that the provision
meant merely two-thirds of those present, assuming the pres.-
ence of a quorum. And this decision was affirmed in a later
case of Rhode Island v. Palmer,21 and also by the National
Prohibition Cases.22 Another pertinent question arose in the
National Prohibition Cases,2 3 that is, to what extent may
Congress regulate the procedure of state legislatures in pass-
ing upon a proposed constitutional amendment? It is a known
fact that Ohio in 1873 ratified the second of the twelve amend-
ments put forth in 1789. The question then is, within what
time must the states act with reference to ratification? Jame-
son, in his treatise on the Constitution, thinks that only a
reasonable time would be allotted for ratification or rejection.
Nevertheless, in the proposal of the Eighteenth Amendment,
20. 248 U. S. 276.
21. 22 R. J. Ap. 944.
22. 253 U. S. 221.
23. 253 U. S. 221.
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there was a time provision that it would go into effect only
if ratified within seven years. Had Congress this power?
Clearly no federal legislation may impose conditions or re-
strictions upon the methods of ratification by state legislature,
although the period within which ratification may be had is
probably within Congressional control. At any rate so it was
held in the National Prohibition Cases.2 4
These two, questions have so far been the only ones of any
importance that have arisen with reference to Congressional
irregularities. There are no instances of a federal amend-
ment being declared invalid because of an alleged irregularity,
and therefore it may be safely said that the courts are very
liberal with regard to Congressional proposals of amendmentb.
But not so as to state legislatures. Here, on the contrary,
the legislatures are held to strict compliance with the letter
of the constitution. it should, however, here be noted that the
state legislatures act in a dual capacity, taking part both in
the adoption of federal and state amendments. As to their
federal duties, but one serious question has ever arisen, and
that with regard to ratification. There were some difficulties
as to just what ratification is, just when it has been accom-
plished, just how and when it may be accomplished. But the
law is pretty v ell settled upon these questions. Ratification,
to begin with, may not be conditional; that is refusal. Though
a state has refused to ratify a particular amendment, she may
yet change, and approve. The offer is there, and continuing,
for a reasonable time, or eise for the specified time, if it is
specified, and it remains an offer despite continuous refusals
to ratify. But once ratification has taken place it cannot be
24. 253 U. S. 221.
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revoked. New Jersey and Ohio learned this with reference
to the Fourteenth Amendment; and so also did New York with
reference to the Fifteenth Amendment.25 Ratification, once
committed, is final, and there is no re-considering. And the
provision that ratification be by three-fourths of the state
legislatures has been held to mean three-fourths of the amount
existing at the time of ratification, for many years may ensue
between the actual proposal and the ratification, and within
that time the number of the states may have increased con-
siderably. It should here be noted too that in those states
which have, of late, adopted the initiative and referendum,
ratification is still governed by the constitutional provisions
of but two methods of amendment, and that, therefore, the
ratification by the state legislature is not open to popular
reconsideration by the initiative or referendum. Hawke v.
Smith.20
Yet as to the state legislatures' action on federal amend-
ments, the courts have been liberal in their view, never yet
invalidating an amendment because of an alleged irregularity.
But it is with reference to their capacity as legislators for the
states that they have been held to a strict compliance with the
law. And the legal reasoning for the stand is very sound.
The legislature acts by virtue of the constitution, under the
constitution, and not above it. If it acts under that instru-
ment it has only those powers which are expressly given, or
impliedly necessary for good functioning, and no more. More-
over, its source of power being only that instrument, it must
25. See 15 U. S. St. at L. 706; 16 U. 6. St. at L. 1131; Prof. J, B. Moore's
Article, 30 Am. L. R. 894.
26. 253 U. S. 221.
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follow its dictates to the letter. It is because of this de-
1endency, then, on the constitution, as the sole source of its
power, that the legislature's irregularities have been made
grounds for invalidating on several occasions. Oakland Pay.
Co. v. Hilton;27 Chicago v. Reeves;28 State v. Macus;2 9 Holm-
berg v. Jones.30
Thus, even after popular ratification the court has voided
amendments merely because those amendments had been en-
tered in the House Journal by title instead of in full. Koeh-
ler v. Hill;31 State v. Brookhart3 2 People v. Strotherf3
Thomas v. Ruggles;3 4 Oakland Pay. Co. v. Hilton;35 People v.
Loomis;38 Durfee v. Harper;37 State v. Tufley.3
Because of slight discrepancies in the- journal entries of
two sessions, although it was clear that both sessions acted
on the identical amendment, nevertheless the amendment was
invalidated. Koehler v. Hill.39
Because the proposed amendment had not been advertised
in the newspapers at just the right time and in accordance
with the requirements, the amendment was overruled. State
v. Tooker.40
,27. 69 Calif. 479.
28. 220 Ili. 274.
29. 160 Wis. 354.
30. 7 Idaho 752.
31. 60 Iowa 543.
32. 113 Iowa 250.
33. 67 Calif. 624.
34. 69 Calif. 465.
35. 69 Calif. 479.
36. 135 Mich. 556.
37. 22 Mont. 354.
38. 19 Nev. 391.
39. 60 Iowa 543.
40. 15 Mont. 8.
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Because the amendment treated two separable subjects,
and there was provision against that, the courts declared the
amendment void. State v. Powell;41 McBee v. Brady;42 Arm-
strong v. Berkey.43
Because the amehdment was proposed by a special instead
of by a regular session of the legislature, it was declared in-
valid. Although in this case the amendment had not yet been
voted on by the people. People v. Curry.44
And for other such reasons, seemingly trivial from the
layman's point of view, the courts have in numerous cases
overruled amendments and revisions of constitutions merely
because of the fact that they were enacted by the legislature,
and that the legislature is held to a strict compliance with the
provisions of that instrument wherefrom it derives its power.
Holmberg v. Jones;4 5 McConaughty v. Secy. of State;46 State
v. Suwit;47 In re Denny;48 State v. Brooks;4 9 Hotch v. Stone-
man;50 State v. Davis;51 Livermore v. Waite;5 2 Collier v. Fri-
erson.
53
Not only is the legislature held to a strict conformity to
the constitutional provisions, but also to several external and
federal limitations thereon. For example, a constitution or
41. 77 Miss. 544.
42. 15 Idaho. 761.
43. 23 Ok. 176.
44. 130 Cal. 821.
45. 7 Idaho 752.
46. 106 Minn. 392.
47. 69 Ind. 505.
48. 156 Ind. 104.
49. 17 Wyo. 344.
50. 66 Cal. 632.
51. 20 Nev. 220.
52. 102 Cal. 113.
53. 24 Ala. 100.
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amendment that destroys the Republican form of government
guaranteed by the federal constitution, Art. 4, Par. 4, would
be construed as revolutionary in nature and would necessitate
the intervention of the federal government. State v. Keith; 4
Penn. v. Tollison.5-56 Nor can impairment of the right of
contract be effected through an amendment or a revision.
Pacific By. Co. v. Maguire;57 Miss. Etc. Ry. v. McClurer8 -50
Let it not be understood, however, because of these enu-
merations of strict constructions by the courts, that there are
no decisions whatsoever upholding the liberal view. For
though they are in the great minority, yet there are some.
For example, in the Prohibitory ArnmndmenV Case"0 it was
held, "the effect of a provision of the constitution requiring
the proposed amendment to be entered in full on the journals
was directory, and not mandatory." This liberal expression
was approved in People v. Sours;"' State v. Winett;0 2 and
McNaughty v. Secy. of State. 3
But in the case of Oakland Pay. Co. v. Hilton,1 Judge
Thornton held that since the power given to the legislature is
a granted power, it has it not without the constitutional pro-
vision. The grant is given to be exercised in the mode con-
ferred on the legislature by the constitution. In such case
54. 64 N. C. 140.
55. 26 Ark. 545.
56. See Cooley's Const. Lim.-44 Federalist No. 43.
57. 20 Wall. 36.
58. 10 Wall. 511.
59: See-Jeffeison Branch Bank v. Skelley, 1 Black 436. Also, New Or-
leans Water Co. v. Rivers 115 U. S. 674.
60. 24 Kans. 700.
61. 3-1 Colo. 369.
62. 78 Nebr. 379.
63. 106 Min. 392.
64. 69 Cal. 479.
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the mode is the measure of the power. Its action outside of
the mode prescribed is a nullity.
And now arises the next factor in the revision of consti-
tutions or in the adoption of amendments-the convention.
Just what are the powers of this extraordinary body, just
what are its limitations, and under what circumstances will
it be held guilty of an irregularity?
Most constitutions in their amendment clauses provide for
a means whereby the legislature shall periodically submit to
the people the question, whether a convention be called or
not. And upon popular approval, the legislature is bound to
the ministerial duty of calling such an assemblage. Yet even
when there were no such provisions, as there were not in
twelve of the thirteen constitutions of the original thirteen
colonies, nevertheless the legislatures, after such popular ap-
proval of proposals, called these conventions to change and
imend the constitutions. Wood App.; 65 State v. Amer. Sugar
Refining Co.00
With reference to the convention, its powers and limita-
tions, there is a decided clash amongst American authorities
and decisions. The one side is known as the strict view; the
other, as the liberal view. The real reason for this division
of opinion lies in the fact that the one side construe the con-
ventions as the direct representatives of the people, in fact,
as the people themselves in session, clothed in all the sover-
eignty, and hence possessing all the powers and not limited
by any enactments, unless those very limitations come from
the people as. such; while the other side construe the conven-
65. 75 Pa. 59.
66. 137 La. 407.
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tions as mere representatives of the people, representing them
even in a lesser degree than the legislative bodies, having
only those powers expressly given and none others, and, there-
fore, bound by every limitation in the enabling clause that
calls them into life.
To illustrate: Courts, looking upon the conventions as, at
best, but ephemeral subordinate branches of government,
brought into brief existence by the enactment of a legislative
or popular provision, have consistently limited them only to
such powers as were expressly given or inpliedly necessary-
but no more. Thus there are decisions like Ex parte Birm-
ingham etc. Ry. Co.,67 to the effect that the convention is not
even a coordinate of state government, but an extraordinary
body convened only for the purpose of amending or revising
the constitution. Wells v. Bain;68 Frantz v. Autry.0  Thus
the convention has less power than the legislature, and may
frame and submit proposals, but has not power to enact laws
or ordain amendments. Carton v. Secy. of State;7u Cooley's
Const. Lim.7' In the case of Wells v. Bain7 2 the court even
goes as far as to say "that the delegates possess no inherent
power, and when convened by the law at the time and place
fixed in it, sit and act under it, as their letter of attorney
from the people themselves, and can know and discover the
will of the people only so far as they can discern it through
this, the only warrant they have ever received to act for the
)eople." So also in the case In re Opinions of Justices,u it
67. 145 Ala. 514.
68. 75 Pa. 39.
69. 18 Okla. 561.
70. 151 Mich. 337.
71. Page 61.
72. 75 Pa. 39.
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is said that upon the general principal of delegation of author-
ity and power the convention could be limited to act only on
certain portions of the constitution and on no others. Thus
they may even be limited as to the subject matter for their
consideration, and even the time and manner of their sub-
udssion of their proposals to the people may be prescribed.
State v. McMeekin;74 Foley v. Orleans Dem. Parish Corn.7
Wherefore, under this strict view, any alleged irregularity
on the part of the convention, no other considerations enter-
ing into the case, would invalidate the constitutions or amend-
ments proposed or promulgated.
But there are a vast number of cases, and by far the weight
of authority, that advocate liberalism with reference to con-
ventions construing such bodies as the people in session.
Thorpe Amer. Charters, Constitutions, and Organic Law.",
Therefore they may exercise all sovereign powers that are
vested in the people or the state. Koehler v. Hill;77 Liver-
more v. White.78 It has been held that such bodies, once they
are organized, may even break the limitations set on them by
the enabling acts of the legislatures, for their power is de-
rived not from the legislatures, but from the people. For the
legislature is only the agent of the people in sunmoning the
convention; the act is purely ministerial. "Sproule v. Freaer-
icks;79 Loomis v. Jackson.80 It is even held that the bodies
73. 6 Cushing 574.
74. 20 S. C. L. 1.
75. 138 La. 220.
76. Page 3904.
77. 60 Iowa 543.
78. 102 Cal. 113.
79. 69 Miss. 898.
80. 6 W. Va. 613.
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not only sovereign, but above the legislatures, and in some
cases, even above control from the courts. Frantz v. Autry;8 '
Walck v. Murray;2 McCollister v. Murray. 3-8 4
Judge Hainer in Frantz v. Autry quotes from the Reports
of the Judiciary Conmittee, New York Constitutional Con-
vention Proceedings of 1894, in substantiation of the above:
"The reason and necessity for independence of the constitu-
tional convention from legislative or judicial control are due
to the fact that it has to pass upon the powers, emoluments,
and very existence of the judicial and legislative officers who
might otherwise interfere with it. The convention furnishes
the only way by which the people can exercise their will, in
respect of these officers and their control over the convention
would be wholly incompatible with the free exercise of that
will. ''
The liberal view is so dominant that there are decisions
recognizing the right in the convention to enact and promul-
gate a constitution even without any submission to the people.
Such was the decision in Cox v. Robinson;3 Quinlan v. Hous-
ton;8 1 State v. Wimberly;87 State v. Favre;88 State v. Neal;80
Miller v. Johnson 0 Moreover, even where the legislative
81. 18 Okla. 561.
82; 18 Okla. 712.
83. 18 Okla. 716.
84. See-tercts of Judiciary Committee, N. Y. Const. Cony. Pioceed-
Ings 1894.
See-Greer County v. Oakland, 18 Okla. 707;
State v. Favre, 51 La. Ann. 434;
McMullin v. Hodge, 5 Tex. 34.
85. 105 Tex. 426.
86. 89 Tex. 356.
87. 50 La. Ann. 1330.
88. 51 La. Ann. 434.
89. 42 Mo. 119.
90. 15 L. R. A. 524.
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onactments, calling the assembly expressly stated that no con-
stitution drawn up by the convention shall be valid until after
submission, yet as long as that convention had promulgated
the constitution and it had been enforced by the other depart-
ments of government, the courts will not invalidate because of
such an alleged irregularity. Kamper v. Hawkins;91 Taylor
v. Com,. 92 Jameson, in his treatise, says that up to 1887,
of one hundred and fifty-seven conventions, one hundred and
thirteen had submitted their proposals to the people; forty-
four had not. Since then fourteen state constitutions have
been adopted, seven of these were submitted to the people;
six were not; and one, that of Kentucky, was altered by the
convention after it had received popular approval. The con-
stitutional convention is so unhampered that in In re Gibson,9
it was held that unlike the legislatures, which are obliged to
look carefully to the preservation of vested rights, a consti-
tutional convention is competent "to deal with all priVate and
social rights, laws, and institutions then existing, subject to
ratification by the people and to the federal constitution."
Affirmed in 1 Black (U. S.) 587.
There are, however, some limitations, few as they be, that
are recognized and enforced by the courts. The convention
may not contravene the federal provision that the state gov-
ernment shall be Republican in form; the constitution must
not be repugnant to the federal constitution of the United
States; the right to vote shall not be infringed upon by a
distinction based on race or color; the right of contract shall
not be impaired, nor the obligation thereof, by an amendment
91. 1 Va. Cas. 20.
92. 101 Va. 829.
93. 21 N. Y. 9.
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or revision in a state constitution. It has also been held that
when the enabling clause that summoned the convention into
assemblage was passed by the people, then those limitations
included therein are to be guarded and abided by;-but on
this point there is some conflict. Marsh v. BurrowsY4
It is evident from this investigation that there are few
possibilities of invalidation of an amendment that is tinged
with a conventional irregularity.
Still as liberal as the view is with reference to conventions,
the decisions disclose even a greater liberalism in those cases
wherein the people, as such, have already acted. They are
loath to declare an amendment or a constitution void or in
valid, when the people and the other departments of govern
ment have been acquiescent. It has been seen, throughout
this thesis that, when despite all alleged irregularities amend-
ments or constitutions were upheld, it was because, in the last
analysis, the court had reasoned out that the "people had
acted." The real basis of all change is popular assent, there.
fore, it may safely be said here that "lapse of time and gov-
ernmental and popular acquiescence will cure almost any in-
formality." People v. Sours.0 5  The weight of authority is
that courts will not interfere after adoption of an act by the
people-if only possible. Secombe v. Kittelson90 Brittle v.
People;97 Wells v. Bain; 98 Kamper v. Hawkins;0 9 McCormick
94. 16 F. Cas. No. 9, 112;
1 Woods 463.
95. 31 Colo. 369.
96. 29 Main 555.
97. 2 Nebr. 198.
98. 75 Penn. 39.
99. 1 Va. Cas. 21.
296
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In conclusion, this purview of the American decisions re-
veals, beyond a doubt, one striking truth; the realization that
the courts are guided by the American ideal of pragmatism.
A study of tLe decisions discloses the departure from a stifl-
ing law towards a living law, for despite the strict literal in-
terpretations of the law that are illustrated by past cases and
perhaps a few modern, the grea tendency has been towards
this pragmatic view. For once an amendment has been passed
and promulg-ted and acquiesced in by the people, it must be
a glaring irregularity indeed, and a decided one, that will
lead the majority of the courts to invalidate it. The courts
are willing to abide by the political decisions on the question
wherever it is only possible, and so this paper has covered
numerous decisions wherein the court ruled itself concluded
on the basis of political question.
As to legislative irregularities, the courts are more or less
strict, and perhaps rightly so, for the legislatures do act only
by virtue of the constitution and they should, therefore, abide
by it and follow it.
As to the conventions, the courts are markedly liberal-
in fact, some think too liberal. And there are those who raise
the bugaboos of usurpations of power and the like. With ref-
erence to this, it should not be forgotten that in the conven-
tion our liberties had their birth and in the convention they
have ever and continuously been multiplied. To those who
fear, let them see the practical results, as Dickinson so well
said, "Experience must be our only guide-reason may mis-
lead us."
100. 79 Fed. 449.
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Finally, the courts have been guided by popular acquies-
cence and have given as great weight to popular assent as to
political decisions of the governmental departments. This
thesis discloses, then, a pronounced tendency on the part of
the courts to adhere to the substance and nol to the techni-
calities of the law; to face practicalities and experience and
not be phased by mere theoretic possibilities. In a word, to
inject pragmatism where book learning and far removed, and
sometimes far-fetched, theories once guided, in the decision
of the legal effect of an alleged irregularity in the adoption
of a constitution or a constitutional amendment.
MILTON YAWITZ, '25.
*Awarded Thesis Prize by the Law Alumni Assn. of Washington Uni-
versity, June, 1925.
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